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Abstract
The political context for practicing free and independent journalism has always been 
challenging in Turkey and ever more so after the failed coup d’état of 2016. This article 
examines and analyzes the changes brought about by this failed coup d’état in terms 
of their civil, legal, and political significance for news journalism and news journalists. 
More specifically and based on two sets of semi-structured interviews with Turkish 
editors and senior journalists supported by an analysis of gray literature, we argue 
that between 2013 and 2018 Turkey has moved from a pre-coup repression of news 
journalism (2013–2016) to a post-coup oppression of news journalism (2016–2018). 
The former was characterized by unsystematic attacks on news journalism conducted 
with impunity leading to a climate of fear that made self-censorship inescapable. In 
contrast, the latter relied on constitutional changes and the use of law to systematically 
compromise the civil institution of news journalism and to cast news journalists as 
political enemies of the Turkish state resulting in what can be likened to a loss of their 
citizenship. We further argue that the development from the repression to oppression 
of news journalism has been ‘authorized’ and ‘legalized’ by the constitutional changes 
that came into force on 9 July 2018.
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Introduction
Turkey has been governed by the AKP Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi/Justice and 
Development Party) since 2002. Co-founded by Turkey’s current President Erdoğan, it 
positioned itself as a pro-Western liberal party, started accession talks with the EU in 
2005 (which effectively broke down in 2016) and, hesitantly, undertook legal reforms 
with a view to increasing media freedom (Eldem, 2013; Yilmaz, 2016). However, after 
the election success of 2007, it started to exhibit illiberal tendencies which culminated in 
the infamous Gezi Park protest in 2013. Initially a protest against an urban environmen-
tal issue, it became a protest against the government’s attacks on freedom of expression 
and freedom of assembly. Despite the fact that Erdoğan announced a ‘democratization 
reform’ on 30 September 2013, there have been no improvements regarding the freedom 
of the press. Compounding the problems facing the Turkish press are two important 
internal political struggles.
First, the long-standing Kurdish issue. In 2009, the third AKP government made a 
proposal that sought a sustainable solution concerning the recognition of the Kurds’ cul-
tural and political rights in Turkey. However, this proposal, termed the ‘Democratic 
opening’, failed due to a lack of concrete implementation proposals, parliamentary oppo-
sition, and the banning of the pro-Kurdish Democratic Socialist Party (DTP). It was not 
until 2013 that peace negotiations between the Turkish government and the PKK (Partiya 
Karkerên Kurdistanê/Kurdistan Worker Party) were announced. During these talks the 
HDP (Halkların Demokratik Partisi/The Peoples’ Democratic Party), a pro-Kurdish 
Turkish party, gained in popular support and achieved 14% of votes in the June 2015 
general election. Its success was seen as a threat to Erdoğan’s monopoly of power and so, 
following the collapse of the peace talks in July 2015, Erdoğan imposed curfews in the 
Kurdish stronghold of South-Eastern Turkey allegedly to protect civilians while authori-
ties were ‘tracking down militants form the outlawed Kurdish PKK group’ (BBC, 2015). 
However, the curfews resulted in large-scale human rights violations and violence 
against Kurdish civilians. According to the BBC (2015), ‘critics accuse [. . .] Erdogan of 
renewing violence to curb support for the HDP’. These developments had severe conse-
quence for journalism1 and led to the ‘closure of almost all Kurdish language local and 
national media outlets’ (OHCHR, 2017: 4) as well as continuous arrests of journalists for 
allegedly being affiliated with the PKK and for reporting on an ongoing conflict (Article 
19, 2014). In short, ‘an effective media blackout’ (Article 19 and PEN International, 
unpublished draft: 4).
Second, there was the increasing power competition between former allies Erdoğan 
and Fetüllah Gülen. Tensions between the two came to a head in 2013 in the context of 
a large-scale corruption scandal which involved members of the AKP as well as mem-
bers of Erdoğan’s family. Erdoğan denied accusations of corruption, called it a ‘com-
plot’ and a ‘judicial coup’ by followers of Gülen and subsequently attempted to 
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delegitimize the Gülen movement by referring to it as a ‘parallel state structure’ and a 
‘terrorist organization’(Butler and Tattersall, 2014) and to restrict its influence by raid-
ing Gülen-related news organizations. Since May 2016, Gülen’s movement is listed as 
a terrorist organization in Turkey (FETÖ/Fetullah Gülen Terrorist Organization).2 
Subsequently, Erdoğan blamed the attempted coup d’état on Gülen and his movement, 
though Gülen has denied personal involvement. Nevertheless, Erdoğan used the failed 
coup to justify a systematic crackdown on legal and journalistic institutions and increas-
ingly attempted to control the national narrative by reframing these internal political 
struggles as fundamental threats to Turkey.
In this context, the challenges facing media freedom were exacerbated. The Turkish 
press was seen as moving toward too close a relationship with political power and inter-
ests (referred to as political parallelism) (Kaya and Çakmur, 2010; Kurban and Sözeri, 
2011; Way et al., 2018). Media ownership was associated with increasing corruption 
(Christensen, 2007; Corke et al., 2014; Tunç, 2015). Censorship (Akdeniz, 2010; Arsan, 
2013) and off- and online surveillance (Bilge et al., 2017) became endemic.
Within the context of Turkey’s illiberal agenda (Esen and Gumuscu, 2016; Somer, 
2016; Yesil, 2016), we wanted to understand how the restrictions on media freedom were 
experienced by editors and senior journalists. Specifically, we set out to understand what 
the experience to work as a journalist felt like in a political environment characterized by 
internal power struggles, increasing autocratic tendencies and in which political power 
aims to silence critical journalism with impunity. To this end, we conducted a series of 
semi-structured interviews in the spring of 2016 until the attempted coup d’état of 15 
July 2016 disrupted our ability to carry on. When it was again possible, and safe, to speak 
to further interviewees we aimed to understand whether the failed coup had significantly 
worsened the situation for journalists or whether the differences pre- and post-coup were 
perceived as negligible by the journalists. Our main finding is that the situation for jour-
nalists indeed significantly worsened and that Turkey moved from a form of pre-coup 
repression of news journalism (2013–2016) to a post-coup form of oppression of news 
journalism (2016–2018).
Conceptual vocabulary: the repression and oppression of 
news journalism
Political repression is usually defined in a broad way to include threats to and intimida-
tion of specific actors, the use of coercive state power, attacks on personal safety as well 
as ‘torture, “disappearance”, imprisonment, extrajudicial execution, and mass killing’ 
(Davenport, 2007: 2). Whereas Regan and Henderson (2002: 120) define repression as 
‘the systematic violation of the civil liberties and human rights of groups and/or indi-
viduals’, Josua and Edel (2015: 292) consider it ‘the sum of all strategies by ruling elites 
to contain challenges to their rule by constraining [. . .] or incapacitating’ dissenters. 
The range of repressive means include ‘imprisonment, forced disappearances, house 
arrest, killing, [. . .] exiling’ as well as ‘torture, house-to-house search, restricting 
assembly and association rights, restricting the freedom of expression, physical harass-
ment, non-physical intimidation, surveillance, libel, and the restriction of employment 
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and career opportunities’ (Josua and Edel, 2015). None of these definitions captures, 
however, different degrees of intensity or sliding scales from the randomness of attacks 
and violations to them being systematically pursued. Therefore, and in order to be able 
to assess the changes brought about by the failed coup, it is necessary to develop a con-
ceptual vocabulary that adequately captures the differences pre- and post-coup with 
regard to journalism. We propose to redefine repression in a more nuanced way and to 
distinguish it from ‘oppression’ in the following way.
In a repressive setting for journalism, states and state-sponsored actors mobilize domes-
tic laws to restrict media freedom on specific occasions chosen by them, but don’t use them 
in any systematic way. What is systematic though is the legal inertia that occurs when 
journalists or news organizations try to appeal against state-sponsored violations and vio-
lence. If appeal procedures are evoked, they are not pursued by legal authorities with any 
vigor. Cases simply get closed or decided in favor of the government. In other words, the 
legal system is visibly compromised. States and state-sponsored actors will, again on occa-
sion, threaten individual journalists publicly and condemn independent and critical journal-
ism. Importantly and characteristically, regimes aiming to repress journalism operate with 
a certain ‘randomness’ creating a climate of insecurity, uncertainty, and fear (also Davenport, 
2007). The message that is sent by the random attacks on media freedom is that no inde-
pendent and critical journalist can ever rely on being safe but rather that journalists are 
required to live ‘constantly at tiptoe stance’ (King, 1963: 2). Accordingly, and experien-
tially, a random attack becomes a constant possibility for every journalist. This generates a 
climate of fear which, in turn, can lead to two reactions that exist side by side: first, the 
practice of self-censorship. Here, it is important to understand the subjective experiences of 
journalists – particularly the way in which they understand and perceive the pressures and 
constraints placed upon them and how they try to avoid them by resorting to self-censor-
ship. Second, the refusal to self-censor where journalists decide strategically on a story-to-
story basis ‘how far they can go’ in directly providing critiques or how they can appear to 
follow the official line while undertaking criticism obliquely through codes, tropes, insider 
metaphors, and similes. In short, journalists adopt a set of navigational skills. The first reac-
tion is a matter of how repression produces the affective conditions that generate conform-
ity; the second reaction shows that the civil capacity of journalism, although restricted, can 
survive and, on occasions, manifest itself in a form of civil resistance against the repressive 
regime. What sustains the climate of fear in such a repressive regime is the Politics of 
Impunity which refers to the way state-sponsored actors can commit acts of violence 
against journalism with guaranteed legal immunity (Harrison and Pukallus, 2018).
An oppressive regime can be defined by ‘laws, customs or practices that systemati-
cally produce inequalities that oppress specific groups within a society’ (ShareAction, 
2017). In relation to journalism, we define oppression as comprehensive civil diminish-
ment (see ahead) brought about by active and systematic attacks on both journalism and 
journalists. The outcome is an institutional oppression of journalism. This is achieved 
through legal means whereby legal institutions become weapons of the state: oppressive 
states do away with procedures for securing consent (unless fabricated) and weaponize 
the constitutional base of law through the (mis)use of amendments. They display the 
exercise of their unlimited power by using the civil institutions themselves to crush any 
form of civil dissent and protest including independent journalism. The law targets 
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journalists in terms of their citizenship and their profession. With regard to the former, 
journalists experience a concrete loss of their citizenship rights and are turned into ene-
mies of the state, effectively non-citizens. With regard to the latter, journalists are charged 
with terrorism or treason and are accused of belonging to propaganda or terrorism organ-
izations. Professionally they are declared a danger to public safety and domestic security 
unless, of course, they follow the official line. In all cases, oppressive regimes ensure 
that ‘the criminalisation of journalists [is] all done “in accordance with the letter of the 
law”’ (RCMF, 2019). However, this actually means that the legal institutions have been 
turned into agents of ‘fundamental injustice’ (Cudd, 2006) and laws have become unjust 
(King, 1963). An oppressive state is institutionally perverse in structure and intent. It is 
systematic and ultimately represents a state of comprehensive civil diminishment in 
which the civil capacity for resistance has been destroyed and the critical voice of civil 
society silenced. Undoing a state of oppression requires constitutional reform, legal 
repair, institutional change, and the (re-)building of trust in the institutions of civil society 
culminating in the safeguarding of civil rights.
We used the above distinction in order to analyze our interview findings and the rel-
evant ‘gray literature’ we consulted.
Methodology
Our study was conducted in two phases: first, in pre-coup Turkey and second, in post-
coup Turkey. In both cases guarantees of anonymity were observed and issues of per-
sonal safety addressed. For the study of pre-coup Turkey, we refer to the interviewees by 
number and the indicative letter ‘N’ or ‘R’ to indicate whether they worked for a national 
(N) or regional (R) news organization. For the study of post-coup Turkey, we did not 
audio-record the interviews but used short-hand to record the interviewees’ responses. In 
the analysis, the interviews are simply referred to as J9, J10, J11, and J12. All of the 
interviewees worked for traditional print news media.
During the first phase, we conducted eight 1-hour in-depth semi-structured interviews 
with Turkish senior editors and journalists from both national and regional news organi-
zations in spring 2016. More specifically, we asked these interviewees about the chal-
lenges in their daily journalistic work and challenges to media freedom generally, how 
they experienced impunity and what impact impunity had on their daily lives. The inter-
views were conducted by a Turkish research assistant in Turkish, audio-recorded, tran-
scribed, and translated.
Regarding post-coup Turkey, we wanted to understand whether the failed coup d’état, 
the subsequent state of emergency and ultimately, the constitutional changes had any 
significant impact on journalists’ professional and personal lives as well as their standing 
as Turkish citizens that would justify us to speak about a move from repression to oppres-
sion. In order to find out, we conducted a set of four 30-minute semi-structured telephone 
interviews with Turkish journalists in November 2018. We are acutely aware of the fact 
that the interviews are shorter and less numerous than before and only represent a very 
small sample. Some of our interviewees actually used burner phones to talk to us or 
public phones at police stations where they trusted the officials. In short, by November 
2018, the situation in Turkey was very dangerous for journalists and it was therefore 
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nearly impossible to find journalists willing to talk and to ensure that interviews were 
untraceable and undertaken in safe conditions. More interviews had been planned but 
had to be canceled because the journalists we intended to interview had been either 
arrested or detained. Accordingly, the conclusions we draw from the data have to be used 
with caution. Nevertheless, we think that this small set of interviews provides a valuable 
insight into the precarious and dangerous lives of Turkish journalists post-coup. The 
interviewees’ narrative also reflected the accounts provided in the ‘gray literature’ spe-
cifically in reports from Pen International, Freedom House, and Amnesty International, 
which we have used to develop the illustrative profiles of Turkey’s repressive and oppres-
sive attitudes toward journalism as laid out in Table 1.
Our analysis proceeds according to the following structure: the repression of journal-
ism in pre-coup Turkey, the catalyst for the move from repression to oppression, the 
oppression of journalism in post-coup Turkey.
News journalism in pre-coup Turkey (2013–2016) – 
repression and the creation of fear through the use of the 
Politics of Impunity
In 2013, Freedom House changed Turkey’s media freedom classification from partly free 
to not free. The pressure on journalists continued in 2013, unsystematically but yet sig-
nificantly. On the occasion of the Gezi park protests – ‘the biggest challenge yet to the 
AKP government after 11 years in power’ (Girit, 2013) – the government and state-spon-
sored actors attempted to censor and ban all reporting on the protests. Whereas many 
media outlets supportive of the government obliged, independent journalists did not 
comply with the ban and ‘at least 75 journalists [were] fired or [. . .] resigned’ (Girit, 
2013), without legal recourse. According to Freedom House, media freedom deteriorated 
Table 1. Repression versus oppression.
Repression of news journalism Oppression of news journalism
Climate of fear sustained by the Politics of 
Impunity leading to self-censorship
Climate of fear through the use of law 
disabling journalism
Lack of legal means against state-sponsored 
violence
Weaponization of the legal system against 
journalists and journalism
Unsystematic/random attacks and public 
threats against individual journalists
Public rhetoric that praises the value of 
journalism while systematically destroying 
journalism as a civil institution
Journalists’ professional activity hindered Journalists lose citizenship status and turn 
into enemies of the state
Pockets of independent journalism 
still existent through the use of in situ 
navigation skills
Institutional oppression of independent 
journalism
Voice of civil society temporarily muted Voice of civil society permanently silenced
Partial civil diminishment: possibility of civil 
resistance
Comprehensive civil diminishment
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further in 2014 as ‘the authorities continued to aggressively use the penal code, criminal 
defamation laws, and the antiterrorism law to crack down on journalists and media out-
lets’ (Freedom House, 2015). In addition,
the government continued to use the financial and other leverage it holds over media owners to 
influence coverage of politically sensitive issues. Several dozen journalists, including prominent 
columnists, lost their jobs as a result of such pressure during the year, and those who remained 
had to operate in a climate of increasing self-censorship and media polarization. (Freedom 
House, 2015)
Across the country the authorities became increasingly intolerant of political opposition, 
public protest, and critical media, while government interference started to genuinely 
undermine judicial independence and the rule of law (see Freedom House, 2017). Media 
ownership had been transformed, leading to a dominance of pro-government media in 
the country. Intimidation, firing of critical journalists, and denial of accreditation to for-
eign reporters further eroded independent reporting. Restrictive laws had been deployed 
to arrest and prosecute journalists, while media groups who criticize the government had 
been fined. By 2015, Turkey had become the country with the highest imprisonment rate 
of journalists (CPJ, 2015a) and the highest number of cases of violations of freedom of 
expression before the European Court of Human Rights. By the time of the failed coup 
in 2016, Turkey exhibited all the aspects of a regime that aims to repress journalism 
including the still unsystematic use of the law to attack journalists without legal redress 
against the state and state-sponsored actors in the case of such attacks. Despite increasing 
pressure on journalists to comply with ‘the official line’ and Erdoğan’s public threats 
against journalists such as ‘The person who wrote this story will pay a heavy price for it; 
I won't let him go unpunished’ (CPJ, 2015b), some independent media outlets continued 
to resist the government’s attempts to be silenced.
In a previous study of India, Pakistan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Bulgaria, and 
Mexico, the authors developed and applied a typology consisting of seven affective 
states that serves as an analytical tool to describe the conditions and journalists’ practical 
experiences of impunity. We used this typology to analyze our interview data from pre-
coup Turkey.
A feeling of helplessness due to a lack of protection from the government, 
media houses, the police, and the international community and 
concomitantly a feeling of helplessness
State power was seen as the most serious challenge to media freedom and journalistic 
activity and as such, protection from the government was not considered to be a realistic 
expectation. Rather, the interviewees expressed their disappointment regarding the lack of 
help and protection from the international community and generally doubted the effec-
tiveness of international initiatives to protect journalists. For example, J1N said, referring 
to the 2012 UN Action Plan on the Safety of Journalists and the Issue of Impunity: ‘I can’t 
really, I can’t believe . . . I am not really sure this ever helped any country, anywhere . . . 
Unless the UN acts in an aggressive way, it is very hard to change the actual . . . the 
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country the way it works, . . . when talking about media freedom we’re talking about an 
entire system’. This feeling was echoed by J2N: ‘If there is an action plan by the UN, I 
think this is a bit late for Turkey. [. . .] This action plan is too late. If I knew about the plan 
I would like to help and do everything I can to enforce it in Turkey’. The attitudes toward 
any protection from ‘the West’ differed as well. On one hand ‘the West’ should not permit 
Turkey to leave the Western world (J2N), but at the same time ‘the West’ was seen as 
hypocritical in its actions. For example, J5R expressed the view that Turkey had become 
a place the West experiments with. Accordingly, ‘the West’s’ sincerity regarding the pro-
tection of journalists in Turkey was genuinely questioned. J5R further explained that it 
was good of ‘the West’ to support media freedom in Turkey but at the same time the inter-
viewee pointed out that ‘the West’ also supported some of the most dangerous anti-media 
freedom groups in Turkey. J4N similarly believed that Europe only applied pressure 
selectively and only ‘if it wanted something’ – in other words, Europe acted out of politi-
cal expediency rather than based on a firm commitment to values and fundamental rights. 
J4N further pointed out that Europe had been overlooking human rights violations in 
Turkey in order not to jeopardize the refugee crisis deal – even EU membership negotia-
tions had been re-opened which, so J4N believed, was unbelievable given Turkey’s level 
of human rights violations. For J4N the West was hypocritical when it came to the protec-
tion of human rights and media freedom. In conclusion, the helplessness was experienced 
due to a lack of protection from the Turkish State accompanied by a perceived lack of 
sincerity in Western governments’ claims to support media freedom in Turkey.
A feeling of professional isolation due to a lack of solidarity among 
journalists
Opinions about to what extent journalistic solidarity still existed in Turkey and could act in 
some way as a counterweight to impunity differed. According to J5R, there were still oppo-
sition media and associations that campaigned for independent journalism under the slogan 
‘we will insist and carry on journalism’ (translation by interviewee). J6R felt that although 
in normal circumstances there wasn’t a strong journalistic solidarity, journalists came 
together on the occasion of attacks. J7R, however, said that only the media company whose 
own journalist died would cover the killing because ‘this journalist belongs to this media 
company’ but wasn’t considered a member of any kind of broader journalistic community. 
J7R also pointed out that journalists generally didn’t respect each other and that media 
companies did not only compete but ‘fought’ each other. J8R thought that maybe if the UN 
brought journalism associations together it could make a difference. Overall, the interview-
ees agreed that pockets of journalism solidarity and associations still existed, but that there 
wasn’t anything that could be likened to a journalistic community on a national level.
A feeling of fear due to continuous direct and indirect threats from 
government and state-sponsored actors and a feeling of fear
The Turkish government was, as noted above, identified as the main threat to independ-
ent journalism. J1N, for example, argued that Turkey was deeply divided and caught in 
a patriotic struggle (though non-systematic at this stage) where you were either a patriot 
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or a traitor. In a similar vein, J2N spoke of the tyranny of the State and the continuous 
pressure emanating from the government on what could be reported (also J4N). To this 
J4N added that journalists’ biggest fear was to express an anti-AKP opinion, to publish 
anything that didn’t make the government look good. According to J3N, Erdoǧan and the 
AKP had been establishing ‘their own media environment’ to protect themselves from 
any kind of criticism or scrutiny.
A feeling of civil isolation due to the belief that there was a lack of 
interest (or disbelief) by the public in daily crimes and threats  
against journalists
Generally, the perception of all the interviewees was that the public believed that journal-
ists were under attack but, as J1N and J2N pointed out, their experience was that the 
public expressed no particular interest in the situation of journalists. This aspect of the 
typology of impunity was less of an immediate concern for almost all interviewees.
A feeling of being in a ‘dead end’ situation due to the belief that there 
was no legal redress
All interviewees were acutely aware of the changing judicial system and its dependence 
on political power. For example, J3N said that the legal system was not working and that 
it didn’t protect journalists because journalists had become part of a bigger fight in soci-
ety and were merely considered casualties. Equally, J4N pointed state-sponsored actors 
usually claim that journalists were spies and were helping terrorist organizations in an 
attempt to silence them. Problematically, the courts chose to remain inert though they 
could have ameliorated the situation for journalists. J1N and J7R noted that the legal 
system had deteriorated over the past few years and that it was impossible to know how 
it actually worked. All journalists agreed that the recent assassinations and attacks on 
journalists made them more careful; J1N felt that there was no hope for the legal system 
to improve.
A feeling of a loss of professionalism due to the inability to undertake 
independent journalism
All the interviewees agreed that independent journalism had become very difficult. J3N 
pointed out that before the 2000s journalistic associations were allowed and media plu-
ralism was accepted but that now, journalists were seen as a mouthpiece for state ideol-
ogy. J8R echoed this view by saying that journalists were being turned into ideologists. 
For J8R, the way of reporting was determined by the question of who would be disturbed 
by the report, whether there would be threats and how the news organization would react. 
According to J1N, Turkish media owners depended on good relationships with the gov-
ernment. J8R added to this that an anti-government line would lead to financial disad-
vantages thereby potentially making the news organizations financially unviable. The 
interviewees considered the impact of these developments on professional journalism 
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was serious. According to J4N, the climate of impunity killed journalism, especially 
opposition journalism. J7R said that any kind of ethical journalism had become danger-
ous and J4N believed that ‘real’ journalism wasn’t possible anymore in the South-East. 
J2N summarized the impact of impunity on journalism as turning it into ‘Goebbels-like 
media’ without ethics. For this journalist, journalism had turned into propaganda – it felt 
as if the whole media environment consisted of a single newspaper.
A feeling of the inevitability and inescapability of self-censorship
The inevitability of self-censorship was expressed by all interviewees. More specifically, 
J5R argued that the biggest obstacle to media freedom was self-censorship of journalists 
and the existence of partisan media organizations. More specifically, J2N, J5R, and J6R 
emphasized that Turkey was a country of fear for journalists and that this fear led to self-
censorship. Self-censorship occurred when stories that were worth reporting were deleted 
because they didn’t fit the editorial line (J5R and J7R). Any kind of resistance was made 
impossible (J2N).
What the above analysis lays bare are journalists’ feelings, experiences, and percep-
tions usually hidden from the public eye. It shows how regimes can enhance journalists’ 
risk perception – whether the risk is imagined or real – and create fear while yet uphold-
ing the illusion that self-censorship is voluntary. In short, fear and continuous ‘what if 
. . .’ questions sustain the repression of news journalism.
From repression to oppression: the failed coup d’état and 
subsequent legal and political changes
As a response to the failed coup d’état which Erdoğan called a ‘gift from God’ (Taş, 
2018: 402), the Council of Ministers, based on recommendation nr. 498 made by the 
National Security Council, declared a state of emergency on 20 July 2016 for a period of 
90 days starting from 21 July 2016 in accordance with Article 120 of the Turkish 
Constitution.3 In total, the state of emergency (OHAL) was to last 24 months. Although 
domestically legal,4 the scope and length of the state of emergency enabled restrictions 
on human rights and fundamental freedoms (including the right to freedom of expression 
and to a fair trial) far beyond what is permissible under international human rights law 
(see also Freedom House, 2018).
In 2017, the Turkish government held a referendum on constitutional changes which 
was approved by the Turkish people in a climate of uncertainty and chaos. The referen-
dum marked ‘a transition from an already incongruous parliamentary system to rampant 
presidentialism’ (Bilgin and Erdogan, 2018: 29). Picarella (2018: 9) spoke of ‘super-
presidentialism’ which required absolute loyalty to the President and an unconditional 
effort to secure the integrity of the Turkish state. It also undermined the separation of 
powers and provided the President with a high degree of power over the legislative 
branch and the judiciary.
The constitutional amendments that came into force on 9 July 2018 with the declara-
tion of the Fourth Erdoğan Cabinet gave the Turkish President almost limitless discre-
tionary powers which, in turn, allowed the undermining of civil liberties to be continued 
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legally even after the state of emergency was officially lifted on 18 July 2018. In fact, the 
use of pre-coup anti-terror laws as well as specific articles from the Turkish Penal Code 
started to be used more systematically than before to bring charges against critical jour-
nalists (for details see . Article 19 and PEN International, unpublished draft). Journalists 
were equally accused of ‘denigrating state institutions’, ‘inciting the public to enmity and 
hatred’, and ‘attempting to overthrow the constitutional order’ (RCMF, 2019). 
Amendments to pre-coup laws, especially anti-terrorism laws,5 enable the ‘Turkish exec-
utive to apply sweeping measures, including against the media and NGOs (among oth-
ers), without any evidentiary requirement, in the absence of judicial decisions and on the 
basis of vague criteria of alleged “connection” to a terrorist organisation’ (Article 19 and 
PEN International, unpublished draft: 4). Overall, the constitutional changes and other 
legal amendments in combination with the dismantlement of the legal system, that is, the 
rule of law, allowed for the continuation of the post-coup crackdown on civil liberties 
and civil institutions particularly the news media.
In line with Taş (2018: 402) who identified the failed coup d’état as a ‘pretext and cata-
lyst to [. . .] re-engineer the state’s structure’ and destroy critical and independent journal-
ism, our interviewees considered the failed coup d’état a crucial moment in the deterioration 
of Turkish journalism and civil liberties – or in the establishment of what we call an 
oppressive setting for journalism. According to our interviewees, the Turkish government 
used the failed coup as an excuse to divide and polarize society. J9 pointed out,
After the coup the government picked up a political rhetoric [through] which society was 
polarized. You were either in favor, in their eyes, of the coup perpetrators [considered by the 
AKP government to be Gülenists] or of the government that ‘defended civilian politics’.
In short, pro-government journalists would be praised by Erdoğan whereas oppositional 
journalists became enemies of the state. Accordingly, the state of emergency, so the 
Turkish government reasoned, needed to be maintained in order for Turkey to be able to 
persecute the new enemies of the state – independent judges, civil servants, NGOs and 
importantly, journalists. Journalists were now seen as political actors, as ‘militants’ (J11) 
rather than as part of ‘civilian politics’. Accordingly, as J12 argued, ‘the coup was a 
chance for the government to legitimize the crackdown in the eyes of its voters and it has 
used it well’. Indeed, the unprecedented crackdown on civil liberties and importantly 
civil institutions – both the law and the factual mass media – that started in the immediate 
aftermath of the failed coup d’état continues to this day. With regard to the former, the 
legal system has been dismantled with great speed since 15 July 2016. What judicial 
independence existed prior to the coup has been eviscerated as the courts are packed with 
political appointees and the legal system has been transformed wholescale into a system 
of repression. In fact, ‘by late 2017, more than 4,000 judges and prosecutors had been 
removed. Judges and trials in high-profile cases are transferred to ensure that the govern-
ment’s arguments are presented before a sympathetic court’ (Freedom House, 2018). 
With regard to the latter, the crackdown on the independent factual mass media means 
that since July 2016, at ‘least 156 media outlets have been shut down by executive 
decree’ 6686 (Amnesty International, 2017: 2) and according to the Union of Journalists 
in Turkey (TGS), an estimated 2500 journalists and other media workers have lost their 
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jobs as a result. In addition, the Directorate General of Press and Information has revoked 
the press credentials of 778 journalists (Amnesty International, 2017).
What is crucial here is that the courts have played ‘a central role in the deterioration 
of press freedom’ (Index on Censorship, 2017). In other words, the legal system has been 
perverted to become a weapon in the fight against freedom of expression and critical 
oppositional journalism. At the time of writing,
204 journalists in total have been arrested or detained on account of their publications. Of these, 
42 have been convicted, 89 remain under arrest or detained and 73 have been released. New 
arrests of journalists and media workers continued throughout 2018 in particular in the Kurdish 
South-East area. (Article 19 and PEN International, unpublished draft: 3)
The comprehensive oppression of news journalism in post-
coup Turkey (2016–2018)
Turkey’s move toward the oppression of journalism reflects Agamben’s (2005: 2) defini-
tion of authoritarianism as
the establishment, by means of the state of exception, of a legal civil war that allows for the 
physical elimination not only of political adversaries but of entire categories of citizens who for 
some reason cannot be integrated into the political system.
In Turkey, those who undertake critical journalism, aim to hold power to account and 
don’t follow the official line, are now cast as enemies of the state. They are required to 
live in a comprehensive state of civil diminishment – some have referred to it as ‘civil 
death’ (Moritz-Rabson, 2018) – which, as the interviews and the analysis of gray litera-
ture revealed, has two main features.
Journalists as enemies of the state and non-citizens
The oppression of Turkish journalism has reduced the civil standing of journalists. They 
have been stripped of fundamental citizenship rights including the right to a passport, free 
movement, and a fair trial. The restriction of free movement extends to both journalists’ 
professional and personal lives. J9 argued that it was very dangerous for journalists to 
travel without the yellow press card.7 The card provided some form of security as it was 
issued by the government to those journalists who were still allowed to report (also J11). 
J10 expressed concerns about traveling within the country to simply interview a source or 
to even go on the street to report. In fact, journalism had become limited to what could be 
done from a desk. J12 described how both he or she and his or her partner were affected 
by restrictions to freedom of movement. His or her partner worked for an NGO but his or 
her work and residence permits were revoked and he or she was denied his or her right to 
enter Turkey. The journalist talked about his or her constant fear of having his or her pass-
port confiscated and becoming stuck in Turkey. Freedom House spoke of
an unknown number [who] had their passports revoked and were forbidden from leaving the 
country, and 54 journalists [who] had their property confiscated (Freedom House, 2017). 
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Article 19 and PEN International referred to ‘Many of those who have been released have been 
given a suspended sentence and placed under travel ban, preventing them from leaving the 
country. (unpublished report: 3)
To this Amnesty International (2017: 4) added that journalists and their families lost 
‘housing and health care benefits’, that the stigmatization of being branded a terrorist has 
left them unable to find work, and that they have also ‘been prevented from seeking 
employment abroad, as the decrees also require the cancelation of their passports’. Civil 
rights such as the freedom of movement, the right to work, and the right to join associa-
tions have effectively been suspended for journalists (Freedom House, 2018) and by 
extension their families. This has been equally the case for their citizens’ rights concern-
ing the rule of law. Journalists have been facing a systematic threat of arbitrary detention 
and have been outcast to such an extent that anyone who wants to attack them can do so 
with impunity.
The majority of arrested Turkish journalists have faced charges for being in some way 
apologists for terrorism or for ‘membership’ of armed organizations (Article 19 and PEN 
International, unpublished draft). J12 noted that ‘arbitrary detentions, being blocked 
from seeing a lawyer, long arrests and being jailed without indictment are almost com-
mon practice now’ with ‘court cases based on statements of anonymous witnesses’. To 
this J10 added that
the cases of imprisoned journalists in Turkey are full of fabricated evidence, arbitrary arrests, 
long prison sentences and non-proportional penalties. Most journalists are in jail because of 
what they have written, said, or according to which media they worked for. News or tweets are 
often used as criminal evidence.
What this shows is that journalists have become
neither prisoners nor persons accused, but simply ‘detainees’. In fact, they have become the 
object of a pure de facto rule, of a detention that is indefinite not only in the temporal sense but 
in its very nature as well, since it is entirely removed from the law and juridical oversight. 
(Agamben, 2005: 4)
International law has been breached, the domestic rule of law has broken down, and there-
fore the restrictions of their civil rights have been extending far beyond physical imprison-
ment. Exacerbating the situation was the failure of both the Constitutional Court and the 
European Court of Human Rights to provide justice in a reasonable amount of time.
Physical violence including ‘torture’ has been exercised against journalists with 
impunity by the ‘State, civilians and police’ (J11). According to J9, if ‘you are not a pro-
government journalist whatever happens to you is simply collateral damage [. . .] You go 
out, [. . .] you could be tear-gassed, kicked, bullied’. J11 further explained that the police 
operated with impunity and that doctors didn’t dare to document injuries caused by the 
police out of fear for repercussions:
When I went to the doctor he refused to sign the form to say this injury had been caused by the 
police. He claimed it was the way I had been sitting for years at my desk. But this was a sudden 
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injury. He just didn’t want to be prosecuted for making false statements about the police hurting 
a journalist. (J11)
J11 also explained how the digital environment now posed more threats for journalists 
and that therefore digital safety had become crucially important:
These people find who you are, look through all your accounts, work out where you are going 
to be. One reporter I knew had his location posted online and posts put up asking people to find 
him and beat him to death. But nothing was done about it.
What this shows is to what extent Turkish journalists have been, to use Agamben’s 
(1998: 171) insight, ‘so completely deprived of their rights and prerogatives that no act 
committed against them could appear any longer as a crime’.
Living in an environment characterized by comprehensive civil 
diminishment
The permanentization of the state of emergency into ‘constitutional law’ has had severe 
consequences for Turkish journalists, journalism, and civil society. Protected by the 
Constitution, the Turkish government has been able to systematically oppress journal-
ism and journalists. It has created an environment of comprehensive civil diminish-
ment. Civil diminishment is twofold and occurs (a) when the enabling factors of 
meaningful citizen interaction are undermined and (b) when the enabling factors of a 
participatory civil life are indirectly frustrated, immiserated, or directly prevented 
(Harrison, 2019). In other words, and regarding our particular argument, journalistic 
associative life has changed. Usually, professional associations can act as a vehicle for 
what can be called civil resistance, that is, a form of sustainable civil capacity that ena-
bles journalism to (a) resist and push back against an antagonistic setting thereby pre-
venting it from becoming an oppressive setting, or a dominant setting; or (b) and more 
progressively, to champion its opposition to the circumstances of targeted oppression 
and repression in a form of journalistic solidarity (ibid.) However, this kind of profes-
sional solidarity as a ‘push back mechanism’ has become impossible in Turkey due to 
years of erosion of journalistic freedom and protection, which further worsened as a 
consequence of the failed coup d’état. For example, J12 argued that because of ‘the 
crack down after the failed coup and massive arrests, our campaigns are limited with 
twitter and trying to keep the problem alive on the agenda of the EU and similar institu-
tions to put pressure on Turkey’. To this J12 added that
physical solidarity went down. We can’t organise demonstrations, open stands on streets, get 
signatures from people. In short, we can’t do anything on the street because of OHAL, the state 
of emergency [see above], which was in effect between July 2016 to 2018 and is still continuing 
in practice.
Attempts at citizen journalism as an alternative to professional journalism have equally 
been frustrated. For example, J9 argued (and it is worth quoting at length) that
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citizen journalism changed as after the coup there were mass round ups of citizens, people 
accused of supporting the formation of the coup and there were thousands of investigation 
being filed, thousands being arrested and there was that atmosphere of intimidation, for anyone 
who tried to question or inform their own environment in their own capacity.
This meant that people on social media no longer dared to ‘use their own names as they 
were afraid people would show up on their doorstops’ (J9). Whereas shortly after the 
coup, ‘using VPNs became much more commonplace as you could make sure you 
couldn’t be traced by the IPN address’ (J9), people have since become afraid to use those 
as even needing a VPN account makes people suspicious. Effectively, so J9 noted, ‘citi-
zen journalism died as everyone is now in fear of being labeled pro-coup’. Being a vocal 
citizen, member of an opposition party, or simply having opened a bank account with a 
black-listed bank can cause any civilian to be reduced to bare life in this permanentized 
state of exception. The Turkish government has not only targeted journalists as journal-
ists but also as citizens and used various means to strip them of their citizenship rights. 
Especially, the complete absence of the rule of law has made, according to J12,
life as a citizen [. . .] painful. It’s not easy to keep a sane brain when laws are not implemented, 
when judges decide according to orders they receive from above, when people that I personally 
know are in jail without indictment for more than a year.
Conclusion
We wanted to show that the distinction between repression and oppression is indeed a 
useful one both for understanding Turkey during the period under consideration and by 
extension as an analytical tool for understanding attacks on free and independent journal-
ism elsewhere. Through the use of this conceptual distinction, the characteristic features 
of life under, respectively, repressive and oppressive conditions – in legal, political, and 
civil terms but also in experiential terms – in both pre-coup Turkey (2013–2016) and 
post-coup Turkey (2016–2018) can be shown. Combined and overall, the difference 
between the repression and oppression of news journalism is one of scale and scope 
which, in Turkey, manifested itself in an emphatic change from attacking individuals to 
perverting entire institutions into vehicles of injustice. Repression was supported and 
driven by the Politics of Impunity and left spaces for forms of civil resistance such as 
protests and manifestations as well as certain forms of legal recourse. Equally, journalists 
were still able to be ‘critical’ – typically of an inconsequential kind. Clearly off limits 
were taboo subjects such as the Gülen movement or the Kurdish issue. Neither were 
subject to critical review by Turkish journalists. Oppression was supported and driven by 
the weaponization of the law and led to Turkey finding itself in a state of comprehensive 
civil diminishment which made any form of civil resistance practically impossible and 
too dangerous to attempt. Such resistance as exists is most likely to be found in Turkish 
exilic communities rather than on Turkish territory itself where a blanket attempt to 
silence the press and to control the national narrative exists. Presidential power is to 
remain uncontested with the result that, according to RSF (2019), the ‘rule of law is a 
fading memory in the “New Turkey” of paramount presidential authority’.
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1. We use the term journalism to refer to news journalism.
2. Prior to this, March 2016 marked an increasing crackdown on Gülen-related media organiza-
tions and threats toward journalists suspected of having ties with the Gülen Movement. See 
Muedini (2015), Yavuz and Koç (2016), and Taş (2018).
3. This decision was publicly announced on 20 July by President Erdoğan. The resolution was 
voted upon in the National Assembly on 21 July 2016 and passed with 346 against 115 votes.
4. Since the 2017 constitutional amendments came into force in July 2018, the Turkish President 
can unilaterally request such an extension.
5. For example, a provisional amendment to the previously existing anti-terror law on 25 July 
2018 allowed the Turkish government to continue measures that were introduced during the 
state of emergency for up to 3 years.
6. Attached to decree 668 was a list of both military personnel accused of having participated 
in the coup and of media houses that were shut down because they were suspected to have 
ties with anti-governmental organizations thereby presenting a threat to national security. 
According to the Venice Commission (2017) these news organizations also had their assets 
liquidated. Some shutdowns were overturned by decree 675, article 5 and decree 679.
7. The yellow press card is given out by the Turkish government instead of the International 
Federation of Journalists (IFJ) press card which ‘is valid in 200 countries, but not Turkey’ 
(J11).
References
Agamben G (1998) Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press.
Agamben G (2005) State of Exception. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Akdeniz Y (2010) Report of the OSCE representative on freedom of the media on Turkey and 
internet censorship. Report, OSCE, Vienna, 11 January.
Amnesty International (2017) Journalism Is Not a Crime: Crackdown on Media Freedom in 
Turkey. Turkey: Amnesty International, 3 May.
Arsan E (2013) Killing me softly with his words: censorship and self-censorship from the perspec-
tive of Turkish journalists. Turkish Studies 14(3): 447–462.
Article 19 (2014) Joint submission to the UN universal periodic review of Turkey. Article 19, 
14 June. Available at: https://www.article19.org/resources/article-19-joint-submission-un-
universal-periodic-review-turkey/ (accessed 12 February 2020).
Article 19 and PEN International (unpublished draft) Report Turkey. Obtained via personal com-
munication.
Pukallus et al. 1459
BBC (2015) Turkey restores curfew in restive Kurdish city of Cizre. Available at: https://www.
bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-34240501 (accessed 19 February 2020).
Bilge B, Sözeri KE and Khazraee E (2017) Turkey’s Internet policy after the coup attempt. Internet 
Policy Observatory. Available at: http://repository.upenn.edu/internetpolicyobservatory/22 
(accessed 28 October 2019).
Bilgin HD and Erdogan E (2018) Obscurities of a referendum foretold: the 2017 constitutional 
amendments in Turkey. Review of Middle East Studies 52(1): 29–42.
Butler D and Tattersall N (2014) Turkish judicial purge brings corruption investigation to halt. 
Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-corruption/turkish-judicial-purge-
brings-corruption-investigation-to-halt-idUSBREA0L1G220140122 (accessed 10 February 
2020).
Christensen C (2007) Breaking the news concentration of ownership, the fall of unions and gov-
ernment legislation in Turkey. Global Media and Communication 3(2): 179–199.
Corke S, Finkel A, Kramer DJ, et al. (2014) Democracy in crisis: corruption, media, and power 
in Turkey. Freedom House Special Report, Freedom House, Washington, DC. Available 
at: https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-02/SR_Corruption_Media_Power_
Turkey_PDF.pdf (accessed 14 February 2020).
CPJ (2015a) 2015 prison census: 199 journalists jailed worldwide, 1 December. Available at: 
https://cpj.org/imprisoned/2015.php (accessed 19 October 2019)
CPJ (2015b) Erdoğan threatens Cumhuriyet, editor-in-chief over arms smuggling report. 1 June. 
Available at: https://cpj.org/2015/06/erdogan-threatens-cumhuriyet-editor-in-chief-over-.
php (accessed 19 October 2019).
Cudd AE (2006) Oppression: The Fundamental Injustice of Social Institutions. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Davenport C (2007) State repression and political order. Annual Review of Political Science 10: 
1–23.
Eldem T (2013) The end of Turkey’s Europeanisation? Turkish Policy Quarterly 12(1): 125–135.
Esen B and Gumuscu S (2016) Rising competitive authoritarianism in Turkey. Third World 
Quarterly 37(9): 1581–1606.
Freedom House (2015) Turkey. Available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/5543418355.html 
(accessed 14 April 2020).
Freedom House (2017) Freedom of the press. Turkey Profile. Available at: https://freedomhouse.
org/country/turkey/freedom-world/2017 (accessed 14 April 2020).
Freedom House (2018) Freedom in the world. Turkey. Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/
country/turkey/freedom-world/2018 (accessed 14 April 2020).
Girit S (2013) Turkey media crackdown: who to blame? BBC Turkish, 13 August. Available at: 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-23628066 (accessed 19 October 2019).
Harrison J (2019) Diminishment and Resistance: The civil and anti-civil power of news and news 
journalism. Available at: https://www.unesco.org.uk/news/diminishment-and-resistance-the-
civil-and-anti-civil-power-of-news-and-news-journalism-2/ (accessed 10 December 2019).
Harrison J and Pukallus S (2018) The Politics of Impunity: A study of self-censorship in Bulgaria, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, India, Mexico and Pakistan. Journalism. Epub ahead of print 
5 June 2018. DOI: 10.1177/1464884918778248.
Index on Censorship (2017) Turkey: UN should address continuous deterioration of free expression 
and other human rights. 16 May. Available at: https://www.indexoncensorship.org/2017/05/
turkey-human-rights-deterioration/ (accessed 20 November 2019).
Josua M and Edel M (2015) To repress or not to repress – regime survival strategies in the Arab 
Spring. Terrorism and Political Violence 27(2): 289–309.
Kaya R and Çakmur B (2010) Politics and the mass media in Turkey. Turkish Studies 11(4): 521–537.
1460 Media, Culture & Society 42(7-8)
King ML (1963) Letter from Birmingham Jail. Available at: https://web.cn.edu/kwheeler/docu-
ments/Letter_Birmingham_Jail.pdf (accessed 19 October 2019).
Kurban D and Sözeri C (2011) Does media policy promote media freedom and independence? 
The case of Turkey. Case Study Report, Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation, 
İstanbul, 13 December 2011.
Moritz-Rabson D (2018) Two years after overcoming attempted coup, Turkey plagued by wide-
spread arrests and purges of civil servants. Newsweek, 15 July. Available at: https://www.
newsweek.com/arrests-plague-turkey-two-years-after-coup-attempt-1024287 (accessed 20 
October 2019).
Muedini F (2015) The politics between the justice and development party (AKP) and the Gülen 
movement in Turkey: issues of human rights and rising authoritarianism. Muslim World 
Journal of Human Rights 12(1): 99–121.
OHCHR (2017) Report on the human rights situation in South-East Turkey. Report, OHCHR, 
Geneva, 28 February.
Picarella L (2018) Democratic deviations and constitutional changes: the case of Turkey. Academic 
Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies 7(2): 9–16.
Regan PM and Henderson EA (2002) Democracy, threats and political repression in developing 
countries: are democracies internally less violent? Third World Quarterly 23(1): 119–136.
Resource Centre on Media Freedom in Europe (RCMF) (2019) Media freedom in Turkey. 
January. Available at: https://www.rcmediafreedom.eu/Dossiers/Media-Freedom-in-
Turkey (accessed 26 October 2019).
RSF (2019) Turkey. Available at: https://rsf.org/en/turkey (accessed 25 October 2019).
ShareAction (2017) Oppressive regimes: a guide for investors. Available at: https://shareaction.
org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/InvestorBriefing-OppressiveRegimes.pdf (accessed 19 
October 2019).
Somer M (2016) Understanding Turkey’s democratic breakdown: old vs. new and indigenous vs. 
global authoritarianism. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 16(4): 481–503.
Taş H (2018) A history of Turkey’s AKP-Gülen conflict. Mediterranean Politics 23(3): 395–402.
Tunç A (2015) Media integrity report: media ownership and financing in Turkey. South East 
European Media Observatory. Radar, 30 November. Available at: https://www.rcmedia-
freedom.eu/Publications/Reports/Media-Ownership-and-Finances-in-Turkey.-Increasing-
Concentration-and-Clientelism (accessed 2 November 2019).
Way LCS, Karanfil G and Erçifci A (2018) ‘See no evil, read no evil’: the failing role of Turkish 
newspapers in coverage of Turkey’s 2016 coup attempt. Critical Discourse Studies 15(5): 
481–499.
Yılmaz G (2016) Europeanisation or de-Europeanisation? Media freedom in Turkey (1999–2015). 
South European Society and Politics 21(1): 147–161.
Yavuz MH and Koç R (2016) The Turkish coup attempt: the Gülen movement vs. the state. Middle 
East Policy XXIII (4): 136–148.
Yesil B (2016) Media in New Turkey: The Origins of an Authoritarian Neoliberal State. 
Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press.
